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of a free image. Delayed reaction . . . is then the source of the image-forming power."

The general conception of the ultimate cognitive value of ideas as varying inversely with their immediate motor utility is of course by no means new, but the peculiar merit of this admirable paper seems to the present writer to lie in the fact that its author recognizes not merely the truth of the conception but also its vital importance for the understanding of mental evolution. The primary desideratum of any evolutionary theory is a principle which will allow for a perfectly continuous development of a series of fundamentally different species. Professor Washburn's theory meets this demand. For if we assume that every stimulus expends its energy partly in a motor discharge and partly in modifying a sensory center, we can at once recognize the possibility of two fundamentally different types of organism, in one of which the motor predominates over the sensory result of the stimulus, while in the other the sensory predominates over the motor. As the organism became more and more perfectly adjusted to its environment, its stimuli would be less needed for motor reactions, and would thus become more and more free to expend themselves in modifying the sensory centers, until a *critical point* would be reached in which the energy of the stimulus devoted to sensory modification would just equal the energy devoted to motor discharge. Organisms below this critical point would only possess 'intelligence' or the capacity to profit by *past* experience, but organisms which had passed beyond the critical point would possess 'reason' or the power to form free ideas depictive of the *future*. The difference of the two types of organism would be momentous and yet the evolution of one from the other would be continuous, for it would not directly involve any new factor, but only a change of emphasis in factors already present.

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The Soul—A Study of Past and Present Beliefs. L. D. ARNETT. *The American Journal of Psychology,* 1904, XV., pp. 121–200; 347–382.

This investigation was undertaken by the author, he says, to supply a lack of knowledge on his own part, and for the benefit of others similarly situated. In working toward this result it aims so to present the views of psychologists and of theologians that 'some definite understanding of the use of the term may at least be suggested.'

Primitive ideas of the soul are first considered. The study begins with an effort to get at the conditions that have given rise to this idea and the explanations offered to account for it. The word 'soul' as used by various peoples is dwelt upon. The soul has usually been associated with some animate form,—with the bird, butterfly, mouse, serpent, lizard, fish and other animals. Again it is identified with shadows, with portraits, and with one's image reflected in water or in a mirror. It is most frequently regarded as shadow, breath and wind, then as life, heart, echo, etc. Rarely is the soul believed to be a material object. Sometimes the individual is thought to have a plurality of souls. The soul is located in the heart, in the brain, in the navel, in the blood, in the bones and in the breath. Mostly all tribes atttribute souls to animals; some to plants.

The conclusion of this section is that the primitive idea of the soul can be classed neither as psychological nor as philosophical. 'It is connected more or less with superstitious beliefs.' For the savage the soul probably means life but not mind.

In tracing the ideas of the soul in the Greek philosophers 'a general tendency toward idealism' is seen which reaches its culmination in Plato.

Next are considered theories of the soul classified as theological, philosophical and psychological. While these are to be distinguished they are by no means separable. The first considers the soul in its relation to a 'personal God'—the view of the church. Here 'modern thought tends toward an ethical interpretation of the soul.' The second views the soul in its relation to a world soul, or to the universe, or to the being of the world. The soul for the philosopher is similar in essence to the absolute being. As the conception of the absolute develops in the evolution of new sciences, so will our knowledge of the soul increase. 'The term soul is too large for any one science, each contributes its part to our knowledge of it.' The third or psychological theory defines the soul on a basis of mental phenomena. Here we have the genetic point of view. We have the biological soul, the phyletic soul, the individual inherited soul, the soul of personal consciousness, equaling 'the sum total of conscious reactions,' and the soul of attention representing a cross-section of consciousness. Under the conception of the evolution of soul-life we pass 'from subjective to objective psychology, from feelings to intellect.' Thus the soul may be described, but not defined.

In the above threefold classification, in less than fifty pages, the whole gamut of philosophers has been ranged through down to and including those whom we know *viva voce.*

A questionnaire shows that the soul to the great majority is a theological concept, to a few it is psychological, and to a very few philosophical. The present theological soul is largely the equivalent of 'the totality of a man's life.' 'Recent psychology presents a hostile attitude toward the idea' of a soul. The church, influencing thousands, is a much greater 'factor in molding ideas in regard to the soul' than psychology which reaches the few. For the average man the substance of the soul is found in the feelings. Theories of the self as presented by James, Marshall, Howison, Schiller, Bradley and Royce follow, showing a preference for self, due to its definiteness, over the word soul. The self is more the objective consciousness, while soul is both subjective and objective. The ideas of a soul and of an immortal being persist contemporaneously.

"Our study of the subject leads to the following definitions: for educated thoughtful people the soul probably represents an ethical ideal, in a general way this may be embodied in certain principles, while the majority of Christian people refer to an undefinable mass of feelings."

YALE UNIVERSITY. HERBERT MARTIN.